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PROPERTY LAW IN MISSOURI*
WILLARD L.

ECKHARDT**

I. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LIIVIITATIONS-

IMPLICATION OF REMAINDERS

Mercantile Trust Company v. SowellL is concerned with a very baffling
problem of will interpretation and construction, and is one of those rare
Missouri cases in which the court is not unanimous. The case was heard
first in division two and resulted in two conflicting opinions. On transfer to
banc, the court split four to three, with a majority and two dissenting
opinions. The majority opinion by Westhues, C.J., was concurred in by
Storckman, Leedy, and Dalton, JJ. Hollingsworth, J., dissented without
opinion. Eager, J., dissented in an opinion in which Hyde, J., concurred;
this opinion was based, in part at least, on an original opinion by Bohling,
C. Hyde, J., also wrote a separate dissenting opinion. Seldom have the
lapses of a scrivener been so minutely examined by so notable an array of
able legal minds. One can only speculate whether the lacunae in the will
which created the problem were the consequence of faulty original draftsmanship or resulted from a stenographer's errors in copying, but the former
is more probable.
To facilitate a consideration of the problem, the residuary clause of the
will has been recast into hypothetical form, but the original paragraph and
sub-paragraph numbers have been retained for easy cross-reference to the
verbatim Wording of the will as set out in the opinions. The residuary clause
provided (emphasis added):
5. Residue in trust.
(a) For Widower for life.
(c) On Widower's death, to divide the principal into five
parts, one share for each of the following:
(1) Church.
(2) Niece-1 [53 years old].
*This article contains a discussion of selected Missouri court decisions appearing in Volumes 357-370, inclusive, of the South Western. Reporter, Second
Series.
"Professor of Law, University of Missouri.
1. 359 S.W.2d 719 (Mo. 1962).
(606)
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(3) Niece-2 [55 years old].
(4) Sister-in-law [59 years old].
of sister-in(5) Grandniece, namesake, granddaughter
2
law next above [under six years],
(d) To hold in trust for ten years after Widower's death.
(f) Cross remainders for survivors of the four individual
beneficiaries in case any or several of them die before or
during the term of the ten-year trust; "except that if all
of the individual beneficiaries above named shall predecease me or shall die within the ten (10) year period
and if my husband shall then be dead, the trust shall
dease and terminate and my Trustees shall pay over the
property then constituting such trust absolutely and forever and free from any trust, as follows:"
(1) 90% to University.
(2) 10% to Church.
The widower died two years after the testatrix, and his life estate expired.-The plaintiffs, executor and testamentary trustees, brought a declaratory judgment action for construction of the will. All of the named individual beneficiaries were still alive, and the ten-year trust would not expire
until 1967, unless all of the individual beneficiaries died before 1967.
The will made an express disposition of the corpus in the event all four
individual beneficiaries died before the normal termination date of the tenyear trust, 1967, viz., ninety per cent to the university and ten per cent to
the church. But the great fault of the will was that it made no express disposition of 'the corpus in the event any of the individual beneficiaries survived the ten'year period, and in view of the ages of the individual beneficiaries, it was probable that one or more of the older beneficiaries, .and
it was almost certain that the grandniece, would survive the ten year
period.-In interpreting or construing the will as to what would happen
if any of the individual beneficiaries survived the ten-year trust period,
the court had three principal possibilities.
First, that the corpus will pass under the will to the university and
church on the contingency therein expressly provided for, viz., all of the
individual beneficiaries die before the end of the ten-year trust period,
and under any other circumstances there is partial intestacy and the
2. The ages given are those in 1949 when the will was executed. Each was six
years older than the stated age when the testatrix died in 1955. Each was eight
years older than the stated age when the widower died and the ten-year trust
began in 1957.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol28/iss4/6
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corpus will go by intestate descent to the heirs of the testatrix. Eager, J.,
dissenting, took this view, and Hyde, J., concurred with him to the extent
that he considered this result preferable to the result reached by the majority. Judge Eager's opinion was based on the family situation, the complete omission of any express disposition under the circumstances supposed, and his view that the construction of any disposition of the corpus
would be purely speculative.
Second, that the corpus will pass under the will to the university and
church on the contingency therein expressly provided for, viz., all the individual beneficiaries die before the end of the ten-year trust period, and
by implication the corpus will pass to the church and such of the four individual beneficiaries as survive the ten-year trust period, to the exclusion
of the university. Hyde, J., dissenting, took this view, his argument being
based in part on the family situation and in part on several uses of the word
"principal."
Third, that the corpus not only will pass to the church and university
on the contingency expressly stated, but also by implication in any event
at the end of the ten-year trust period. The majority opinion by Westhues,
J., took this view, his argument being based on the intention of the testatrix
as found in several words, phrases, and clauses.
A fourth possibility, apparently not contended for by any of the parties,
would be that the will is so patently defective that it is void, and all of
the property passes by intestate descent. I do not know how far the case
authorities would support such a contention in view of the fact that a part
of the will is clear and explicit. One strange provision, not mentioned in any
of the opinions, is that the church which has a twenty per cent interest
during the ten-year trust period is cut down to a ten per cent interest in
the express limitation as to the corpus. This would seem to indicate that
the will was a rough draft which not only was incomplete, but in which
the inconsistencies had not been worked out.
A discussion and critical examination of the detailed arguments presented in each opinion would require more space than the opinions themselves. Each opinion is closely reasoned, and any of the opinions read in
isolation is convincing. None of the opinions relies on any case authority
interpreting or construing any similar limitation, but each deals with the
limitation as unique. My own preference is for the dissenting opinions, either
of which would do more justice to the natural objects of the testatrix'
bounty.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1963
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The interpretation of a limitation needs to be distinguished from the
construction of a limitation. A court interprets a limitation when it ascertains
the intention of the testator, from the family situation of the testator and
from the words, phrases, or clauses used in the will by the testator. Construction of a limitation occurs where the intention of the testator cannot be
ascertained, typically because the testator never envisaged the situation that
actually arises, and consequently never had any intention to express. Professor Leach states with reference to construction: "Thus it is the task of the
court less to find an existent meaning than to supplement a defective
imagination."' The principal case, in my opinion, has elements both of
interpretation and construction.
In most cases where courts create future interests by implication'
the dispositive scheme is clear, and the implication of the estate completes that clear scheme. For example, A devises to B for life, and if B dies
wzithout lineal descendants him surviving, to C in fee. If B is survived by
lineal descendants it is clear that C cannot take, but there is no express gift
of a remainder to B's lineal descendants who survive B. It is clear that
the testator intended B's issue to take if B died survived by issue. About
two-thirds of the courts which have considered this problem have implied
a remainder to B's lineal descendants.5 Again, A devises to B in fee, but if
B predeceases the testator not survived by lineal descendants, to C in fee.
If B is survived by lineal descendants (at least if some of them survive the
testator) it is clear that C cannot take, but there is no express gift of a
present fee by way of substitution to such of the lineal descendants of

3. 'LEAcH & LoGAN, CASES ON FUTURE INTERESTS AND ESTATE PLANNING 243
AND SOURCES OF LAw, App. VII, RULES OF CONSTRUC"rioN, §§ 700-705 (1909); c. Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L. RaY.
379 (1907) ("interpretation" of laws and constitutions).
A good example of a Missouri case involving the interpretation of a unique
limitation is In- re Yeater's Trust Estate, 295 S.W.2d 581 (K.C. Mo. App. 1956).

(1961). See GRAY,NATURE

The opinion in that case is not very explicit as to how the court arrived at its

,conclusion, and there is- a much more explicit analysis in Eckhardt, Work of the
Missouri Supreme Court for 1956-Property,22 Mo. L. REv. 373, 378 (1957). The
.case is briefed in Fratcher, Work of thke Missouri Supreme Court for 1956-Trusts
.and Succession, 22 Mo. L. REv. 390, 400 at n. 42 (1957), but with no indication as
to the basis for the.decsion. See also discussing this case, Crow, Future InterestsContingent Remainders-Implied Condition of Survivorship, 23 Mo. L. REV. 87
(1958), indicating that the case is one of interpretation but not giving any de-tailed analysis and failing to cite my analysis of the case.
4. On the problem of the implication of future interests, see generally 2
LIMES & SMrrH, FUruRE INmERrs §§ 841-845 (2d ed. 1956). § 844, "Implication
of Gifts to Complete the 'General Plan' of the Testator," is closest to the problem
n the principal case.
5. 2 id. § 842.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol28/iss4/6
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B as survive the testator. Here again it is clear that the testator intended B's issue to take if B predeceased the testator survived by issue, and
some courts would imply a substitutional gift in favor of the issue. Again,
A devises to B-1 and B-2 for life, and on the death of tke survivor tM C
in fee. If B-I is the first to die, it is easy to imply a cross-remainder of B-i's
half in favor of B-2 for the life of B-2, rather than letting the interest go by
intestate descent. Even in these relatively easy cases for the implication
of estates, cases where the dispositive scheme is obvious, many courts
balk at completing the dispositive scheme by implication, but -let, the
undisposed-of portion go by intestate descent..
The express parts of the will in the principal case do. not indicate any
rather clear dispositive scheme. As pointed out above, the church was
cut from one-fifth to one-tenth in the provisions expressly providing for
the church, but there is no apparent reason for this reduction. It was
perfectly reasonable for the testatrix to make initial provision for an
adequate income for the widower for life (none of the opinions indicate
the size of the corpus of the estate). As suggested by Hyde, J., it was
wholly unreasonable to' make income provisions for ten years for the three
adult individual beneficiaries (ages about 59 to 65 when the testatrix died,
two years older when the ten-year trust began) and to cut them off with
nothing ten years later (at ages 71 to 77, as it turns out), and to make
an income provision for the minor beneficiary (under twelve when, the
testatrix died) and to cut her off with nothing ten years later when her
needs for education and support would be greatest.6 A reasonable dispositive
scheme might have been to provide Income for the three elderly beneficiaries
for life, and for the minor beneficiary for life (or until she completed her
education, or attained twenty-five, etc.), with the corpus ultimately going
to the university and the church upon the expiration of the' life estates.
Another reasonable dispositive scheme might have been to provide income
for each of the individual beneficiaries for a period of years with a gift
of a share of the corpus to the individual if she survived the stated period,
with the corpus going over to the university and church only if none of
the individual beneficiaries survived the stated period. If the' will had expressly indicated either one of these reasonable dispositive schemes (or any
other reasonable dispositive scheme), it would be proper for a court to fill
in minor lacunae by implication to complete either scheme. On the other
6. Additional facts, such as a separate inter vivos trust. coming in for the

individual beneficiaries at the end of the ten-year trust period, would explain this
odd provision, but there is no indication of any such reasonable .explanation.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1963
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hand, the dispositive scheme created by the majority of the court by implication follows, no typical pattern and is not a reasonable pattern; rather
it is a distorted pattern which cuts out the natural objects of the testatrix'
bounty. Insofar as the implication of the gift of the corpus to the university
and church is based on the testatrix' use of certain words, phrases, and
clauses, an equally strong argument can be made in favor of a gift of the
corpus to the church and the four individual beneficiaries.
Where the interpretation of words, phrases, and clauses leads substantially in one direction only, and results in a reasonable dispositive
scheme, the creation of a remainder by implication is justified. But where
the interpretation of words, phrases, and clauses pulls more or less equally
in two opposite directions, it is respectfully submitted that the creation of
a remainder by implication is not justified, particularly 'where the end
result is an unreasonable dispositive scheme. Fortunately, the will in
issue is unique; other draftsmen will make other mistakes, but none is apt
to make substantially the same mistake. Consequently, this case with its
two dissenting opinions sets no real precedent for future cases, except to
the extent that it indicates a willingness on the part of the majority of
the court on less than clear and convincing arguments to interpret or construe a will to exclude by implication the natural objects of a testator's
bounty.

IL

TRANSACTIONS

AFFECTING ENTIRETIES PROPERTY

EXECUTED BY ONLY ONE SPOUSE

A. Mechanics' Liens

The disability of one spouse to deal effectively with an undivided interest in'property held 'by entireties increases the hazard in transactions
affecting property in Missouri. The mechanics' lien problem, where a contract to improve entireties property is made by the husband alone, has
been noted previously in the Missouri Law Review7 Many liens have been
lost because the husband's agency, or estoppel of the wife, could not be
established by the person seeking the lien. Relief by legislation probably
is the only practical solution.
A bill, drafted by several able Kansas City lawyers and extensively revising -the mechanics' lien law; was considered by the Missouri General
7. Eckhardt, Work of Missouri Supreme Court for 1953-Property,"19 Mo.

L. REv. 335, 342 (1954). See also 2 PEr-soN & EcKAAyr,
FoRMs § 951 (1960).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol28/iss4/6
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Assembly in 1963.8 This bill was "approved in principle" by the Board of
Governors of The Missouri Bar. Section 429.021 of the bill was the basic
section creating mechanics' liens, and the last sentence provided as follows
(emphasis added):
Where the contract for an improvement is made with a husband
or wife and the property belongs to the other or both, the husband
or wife so contracting shall be presumed to be the agent of the
other, unless suchk other having knowledge of the improvement shall,
within ten days after learning of the contract, give the contractor
written notice of his or her refusal to consent to the improvement.
This sentence was unchanged in the House Judiciary Committee substitute reported out favorably. In my opinion this provision was a satisfactory solution of the problem, and did not raise any serious question
as to validity in the case of entireties property and might well be valid
even where one spouse entered into a contract for the improvement of
property owned solely by the other spouse.
In House Bill No. 404, as perfected and passed by the House, theword "presumed" was changed to "deemed," and the proviso clause was deleted, so that the sentence read (emphasis added):
Where the contract for an improvement is made with a husband or
wife and the property belongs to the other or both, the husband or
wife so contracting shall be deemed to be the agent of the other.
This floor amendment was most unfortunate in two respects. First, the
word "deemed" is ambiguous. Applying its more usual meaning, an irrebuttable presumption of agency is created by the statute. The editor
of The Missouri Bar Legislative Digest evidently gave "deemed" this
reading because he described the effect of the deletion as follows: "providing a husband or wife shall be deemed the agent of the other, and one
cannot refuse to consent to improvement contracted by the other. ' '10 If
the statute were construed to create an irrebuttable presumption, it probably would be void on constitutional grounds in the case of jointly owned
property, and clearly would be void in the case of property owned solely
by the non-contracting, non-assenting spouse, who in fact might be
8. House Bill No. 404, 72nd General Assembly.
On the deficiencies of the existing statute, see generally Chaney, The Mis.
souri Mchanlics' Lie%Statute-Is it Adequate?, 26 Mo. L. REV. 53 (1961).
9. 3 Mo. BAR LEGis. Di., No. 5, p. 6, Mar. 29, 1963.
10. Vol. 3, No. 8, p. 1, May 24, 1963.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1963
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vigorously dissenting. In any event, if "conclusively presumed" is what was
meant, that is what should have been said.
"Deemed" sometimes is construed as creating only a rebuttable presumption. If the statute were so construed, the statute probably would
be valid, but the person making the improvement would receive little
or no benefit from the statute.
The problem as to the meaning of "deemed" became moot when the
bill did not get through the Senate, but in view of the fact that this bill
probably will be reintroduced in 1965, careful consideration should be given
to the husband and wife agency problem.
B. Contracts for Sale and Leases
Contracts for sale or leases of property owned by entireties, but
executed by only one spouse, have been frequent sources of litigation. This
problem has been noted previously in the Missouri Law Review.11 Austin
& Bass Builders, Inc. v. Lewis1 2 was concerned with a subdivision owned
by H and W as tenants by the entirety, and a contract for the sale of part
of the lots naming H and W as vendors but signed only by H and the purchaser. The contract was drafted by the purchaser, a layman. The transaction was never closed, and the purchaser brought an action against H and
W as vendors solely for damages and solely on the theory of joint liability.
The trial court entered judgment for substantial damages in favor of the
purchaser against both vendors, and on appeal the Kansas City Court of
Appeals affirmed that judgment. On transfer to the Supreme Court by that
court's order, the judgment was reversed with direction to enter judgment
for the vendors.
The facts in the principal case are recited in both opinions on appeal,
but each opinion states certain facts not included in the other opinion. It
would serve no useful purpose here to attempt to summarize the facts, and
it is sufficient to state that the Supreme Court's observation as to the
"vagueness of the whole deal" is apt.
The purchaser, as noted above, brought his action solely on a theory of
joint liability for damages, and based his case on agency (H for W) and
ratification (by W of H's contract). The Supreme Court held that a deed
11. Eckhardt, Work of Missouri Supreme Court for 1952-Property, 18 Mo.
L. REV. 366, 371 (1953), discussing Bobst v. Sons, 252 S.W.2d 303 (Mo. 1952).
12. 359 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. 1962), reversing, 350 S.W.2d 133 (K.C. Mo. App.
1961).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol28/iss4/6
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by H alone would bind W only if H's authority was in writing, Section
432.010, RSMo 1959, the contracts section of the Statute of Frauds. The
court also held that the same necessity for a writing applies to W's alleged
ratification. It was emphasized that no question of fraud or unfair dealing
was in the case as tried.
In its careful opinion the Supreme Court expressly reserved two questions not present in the case as tried. First, would the facts be sufficient in
a suit in equity for specific performance to take the case out from under
the Statute of Frauds? Second, could the purchaser recover damages at
law from the husband-vendor alone? On the latter problem, it should be
noted that in the case of property held by entireties, a contract naming
H and W as vendors, but signed by H alone, is not necessarily the same as a
contract signed by H alone, but naming only H as vendor; in the latter case
H is liable in lamages.23
From a purchaser's point of view, it is essential that the marital status
of the vendors be ascertained; and if a vendor is married not only must
the contract name both H and W as vendors, but also both H and W must
execute the contract. This is true whether the property is owned by the entirety or is owned as separate property by one of the spouses.' 4 In the case
of property owned by the entirety, failure of both to sign may be fatal. In
the case of separate property, the contract may be valid even though
ratification (by W of H's contract). The Supreme Court held that a deed
executed only by the spouse owning the property (not in fact being a
fraud on marital rights, Section 474.150, RSMo 1959), but there is potential litigation by the non-signing spouse, and title will be unmarketable
of record unless both spouses sign the deed."

III. ADVERSE POSSESSION AND USER-PRESUMPTIONSPERMISSIVE OR ADVERSE
In 1956 a recent case note in the Missouri Law Review discussed the
issue raised by Miller v. Berry,'6 whether user of a roadway over the land
of another person is presumed to be adverse or permissive, and noticed the
13. See Bobst v. Sons, supra n. 11.
14. In case of separate property, a recital in the contract should make it clear
that the spouse who joins simply to subject marital rights to the contract is not
assuming full liability for the performance of the contract.
15. If the property is homestead, joinder of the wife still is essential for a
valid transaction, § 513.475 (2), RSMo 1959. Where she does not join, the transaction is "null and void" as to the homestead.
16. 270 S.W.2d 666 (Mo. App. 1954).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1963
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uncertain state of Missouri authorities in this area.17 The problem of
presumptions became critical in Saville v. Bradshaw,'2 but the case was
remanded for retrial to develop the facts, and the legal issue still is without
a definitive answer.
Savile v. Bradshaw was a suit to quiet title. The plaintiffs claimed
through their deceased father who had purchased the land in 1928 and
had lived on the land until he died in 1956, having recorded his deed in
1939. Defendant claimed through a 1934 tax deed recorded in 1944. The
trial court entered judgment for the defendant on the theory that possession after 1934 was permissive, not adverse, based on testimony of the
defendant as to a conversation with the father (now deceased) of the
plaintiffs. Timely objection that this testimony was inadmissible under
the Dead Man's Statute's was overruled, but on appeal the judgment was
reversed because the testimony was admitted erroneously. Barrett, C., in
his incisive opinion called attention to the problem of presumptions, but
properly did not indicate what presumption might be applied in the ab20
sense of evidence as to permissive possession.
If, in fact, possession was permissive (through charitable motives) from
and after the 1934 tax sale, the owner of the tax title who gave the permission to the deceased occupant is in a very difficult position. By reason
of the Dead Man's Statute he may have no admissible proof as to the permissive character of the occupancy. In the absence of any proof as to the
permissive character of the occupancy, the case will turn on a presumption
17. Parish, Real Property-Easements-PrescriptiveRight-PresumPtion that
User is Permissive or Adverse, 21 Mo. L. Rxv. 91 (1956).
18. 359 S.W.2d 676 (Mo. 1962).
19. § 491.010, RSMo 1959.
20. In another case decided by the same division several months earlier,
White v. Wilks, 357 S.W.2d 908, 912 (Mo. 1962), the court flatly states that proof
of adverse possession is insufficient where the one who claims title by adverse possession simply shows possession for fifty-seven years. "But proof of title by advere possession requires much more, and the burden is on those asserting such a
title." The court then sets out the several elements of adverse possession which
must be proved, that the possession was actual, hostile, under claim of right, open
and notorious, exclusive, and continuous, as well as of sufficient duration. The
court does not notice any room for indulging in presumptions. The court in White
v. Wilks had no real occasion to examine any of the refinements as to adverse
possession because the proof in the case affirmatively showed that the "adverse
possessor," a life tenant under a fee tail limitation, claimed a life estate only and
recognized the defeasibly vested reversion in fee in the grantor and his heirs. The
real issue in the case, insufficiently pleaded and developed by proof, was this:
assuming the grantor of the fee tail had no title, did the life tenant by adverse possession acquire title in fee for herself to the exclusion of the reversioners, or did
the life tenant acquire title for herself for life and also for the reversioners in fee
by application of the "estoppel by will" theory to a deed.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol28/iss4/6

10

Eckhardt: Eckhardt: Property Law in Missouri

616

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

as to the nature of the occupancy, and in some cases this might even turn
on whether the record title holder is a plaintiff with the burden of proof,
or is a defendant.
Saville v. Bradshaw, the principal case, points up the fact that a landowner who is a good neighbor and generous by letting another use or occupy
land may end up by iosing his land or an interest therein. It is imperative
that permissive user or occupancy be evidenced by a written instrument
signed by the user or occupant (preferably acknowledged so as to be
recordable) so that there can be no later dispute as to how the user or
occupancy was initiated.
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